Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics

Posted March 7, 2008 

There is a wide divergence of opinion among scholars and policy makers about the evolving security environment faced by the United States in Asia, and foremost among the contentious issues is the future character and strength of the People’s Republic of China. There is an increasingly distinct divide between those who view China’s rise as a clear threat to U.S. interests and those who, while not discounting the possibility of a conflict, view China’s rise as an opportunity.

Though William Overholt may fall clearly into the latter category, one does not have to agree with him on this point to gain insight from his most recent book Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics. In fact, in the preface to the book, he boasts, “There is something in the pages that follow that will upset virtually everyone.” He does not disappoint.

Mr. Overholt makes numerous assertions that are provocative, contrarian and quite possibly hyperbolic. However, his experience and record of strategic foresight—he, for example, predicted the Soviet Union’s economic collapse and China’s economic successes at least as early as 1983 when the conventional wisdom among experts predicted the opposite—alone merits careful consideration of his perspective. Mr. Overholt spent over 30 years as a corporate executive, scholar and adviser to government officials throughout the region, and is currently serving as director of the RAND Corporation’s Center for Asia Pacific Policy.

One of his most controversial assertions is that the U.S. push in the past decade for closer military ties with Japan—with an implicit focus on containing China—is empowering right-wing Japanese politicians. This could have dangerous consequences for the region.
Mr. Overholt concedes that part of the drive for a closer U.S.-Japan alliance—including an expanded role for Japanese military forces and an effort to revise its post-World War II Peace Constitution—stems from a frustration with Japan not making a military contribution to the first Gulf War and legitimate concerns relating to North Korea.

However, his primary concern is that the evolution of U.S.-Japanese relations signals an implicit abandonment of the successful U.S. effort throughout the Cold War to “never again allow Sino-Japanese competition to spiral out of control.” The U.S. achieved this balance by providing forces to ensure protection of Japan while simultaneously discouraging Japanese military expansion and thereby reassuring Japan’s neighbors—mainly China and South Korea.

Mr. Overholt’s emphasis on a re-emerging extremist right wing in Japan—an element of Japan’s body politic that he asserts is not necessarily pro-American—seems to be somewhat undercut by recent events, especially Yasuo Fukuda becoming prime minister in September 2007. Mr. Overholt, whose book was published in 2008 but clearly completed prior to the prime minister’s appointment, only mentions Mr. Fukuda once, describing him as, “the leader of the forces demanding that Japan pay more attention to good relations with its Asian neighbors.” Since becoming prime minister, Mr. Fukuda has made improving relations with China a priority, evident in part by his visit to Beijing in December and his pledge not to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. Whether Mr. Fukuda’s conciliatory foreign policy becomes institutionalized or successor governments trend more towards revisionist tendencies that Mr. Overholt fears will clearly be an important variable to watch.

The book’s overarching thesis is that “America’s relations with Asia continue to rely on institutions that are a legacy of the Cold War,” and that those institutions—broadly interpreted to include doctrines, policies and alliances—are no longer appropriate for a region that is experiencing profound economic and geopolitical change. Today, he contends, a U.S. national-security establishment that was erected in the 1940s to combat communism has mistakenly shifted its aim toward a China that has abandoned communism in favor of market capitalism, promotes international stability instead of revolution, has resolved most of its border conflicts and is (very slowly) experimenting with democratization that its leaders view as essential to future development and stability. Failure to appreciate this shift “has led to a potentially catastrophic misreading of China in much of the West.”

Mr. Overholt presents a nuanced (and increasingly mainstream) argument that China is transforming in a positive direction. But the book is more than just a contribution to the “China as strategic threat” versus “China as strategic partner” debate. Mr. Overholt also presents perceptive and, not surprisingly, provocative assessments of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Russia and Central Asia that are of value to those with or without in-depth knowledge of those regions.

The book is peppered with insight gained from personal experience dealing with Asian leaders at the highest levels. On dealing with China’s leadership, for example, he counsels, “you can’t be the least bit soft, but you can’t expect to make progress by publicly humiliating them.” He also extols the benefits of globalization, particularly in places like India and China where hundreds of millions of people have been raised out of poverty “at the cost of some slowing of wage growth in the West.” And he delivers frank prescriptions for what works in today’s globalized world: “highly open, entrepreneurial economies that emphasize competition.”

Mr. Overholt’s biggest worry though seems to be the implications of a potential backlash against globalization. This could trigger a chain of events leading to severe global recession and eventually the emergence of dictatorial regimes reminiscent of what followed the last global economic backlash in the 1920s and 1930s.

He examines this potential development in the most interesting chapter of the book: an exploration of six potential scenarios, plus five less likely “surprises” that could emerge in the region. In addition to the backlash against globalization scenario, he adds scenarios titled: “Business as Usual,” “Cold War II,” “Reversal of Partnerships,” “U.S. Disengagement,” and what he sees as the only stable scenario, “Peaceful, Balanced Globalization.” Predictably, the “Emergence of an Aggressive China” scenario is placed in the surprises section.

Only time will tell which, if any, of Mr. Overholt’s scenarios will materialize. However, understanding the kinds of secondary and tertiary effects explored in the chapter, and indeed throughout the entire book, will no doubt assist those with the power to influence future scenarios to advance positive ones.

Justin Giovannettone is a captain in the U.S. Air Force.  The views expressed here are his own.