Talking With the Terrorists
by Shaukat Qadir
Posted May 7, 2008
Considering the number and frequency of the suicide attacks taking place, there was little doubt that the Pakistan government had no option but to open negotiations with the insurgents in Waziristan and even the established terrorists. I do not subscribe to the theory that “one does not negotiate with terrorists." One might as well say, “one does not negotiate with the enemy.” Who else will one negotiate with, if not those that pose a threat? Having stated as much, there is also little doubt that negotiations, particularly with active terrorists is a highly complicated and delicate process.
The government began by releasing Maulana Sufi Muhammed, incarcerated for many years, the leader of the Tehrik-Nifaze-Shariae-Muhammedi, TNSM, (organization for the imposition of the Prophet Muhammed’s religious laws). Sufi is also the father-in-law of Maulana Fazlullah, the fiery cleric who, with al Qaeda assistance, attempted to take over the Swat valley recently. However, since his release, Sufi is now preaching that Islam is a religion of peace, the very opposite of what he was practicing when he was incarcerated.
Immediately following this gesture, Baitullah Mahsud, the self-styled leader of the Pakistani Taliban, declared a cease-fire in Waziristan and a peace process was initiated. However, within 24 hours of the beginning of the peace process with Baitullah, a police station in Mardan was attacked by a suicide bomber killing half a dozen, including a police constable. Two other suicide bombers were apprehended before they could do damage.
Baitullah’s contention was that due to the vast distances in the area, which is true, some of his followers may not have learnt of his instructions. But considering the speed with which news travels over the tribal grapevine, this seems highly unlikely. Nevertheless, Batullah has threatened violators of the cease-fire with dire consequences, even after there was a cessation in the negotiations. Moreover, other self-styled leaders have also expressed their willingness for talks, while some, like Mengal Bagh Afridi, are threatening to come to carry out vigilante justice for anyone who claims to be oppressed by the government or a powerful individual.
Meantime a number of banned jihadi outfits; the Harkatul Mujahideen (movement of jihadis), Hizbul Mujahideen (Party of Jihadis), Al Badr (drawing their title from the battle of Badr fought by the Prophet Mohammed), and the Jaish-eMuhammed (supporters of the Prophet Mohammed), have re-opened offices in Karachi, unhindered by the provincial government. Though a matter of some concern, with the newly appointed Inspector General of Police for Karachi, Shoaib Suddle, I am not too worried. He is one man who can and will deal with all such threats effectively and promptly.
As of April 29, Batullah decided to halt negotiations, while continuing the cease-fire since the army was not prepared to pull out of Waziristan, the Mohmand Agency, or Swat. Understandably, the army is not prepared to cede what it has gained until the negotiations have made some headway, lest they are forced to start again from zero. The Mohmands, on the other hand, are threatening to revert to the use of force immediately, if the army does not withdraw; most of this is the usual posturing during negotiations; while Fazlullah, the most weakly placed, and the “independent Taliban group” are prepared for unconditional talks.
The peace package being negotiated appears fairly encouraging: Apart from an undertaking by the tribals to evict from their areas all foreign elements—including, though not explicitly stated, Taliban and al Qaeda fighters—it includes a commitment by them to cease all violence of any kind within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan.
Despite the current hitches being experienced, which are to be expected and can be resolved, purely from a Pakistani perspective, this process provides a ray of hope to the citizens of Pakistan of the cessation to the unprecedented violence that we have witnessed over the last two years; however, there are two other important issues involved.
Firstly, there is a perception, not only abroad, but also shared by many in the corridors of power in Pakistan, as well as by some of the extremists that this peace initiative is premature and has been initiated by the government from a position of weakness. Secondly, that the fact that the current bargaining is confined to terminate acts of violence only within the territories of Pakistan, may be a “difficult sell” to our partners in this war, particularly the Americans.
It is my view that, depending on how firmly the political government, with the cooperation of the army, handles the negotiations; the issue of being in a position of weakness can be easily overcome. Also, that if the Americans can give Pakistan a “breathing space” of two to three months in which foreign elements are expelled and peace reigns in these regions, only those Afghans will seek to cross over into Pakistan who are desirous of living in peace. What is more, the fact that there is a region of peace along the Afghan border will create its own dynamics in Afghanistan, where millions of Afghans want nothing other than a return to a peaceful life after almost four decades of violence.
Admittedly, even the Pakistani jury is still out on the verdict regarding the success of these negotiations, but if this process can succeed, the crucial question really will be whether the Americans can be persuaded to share that hope and wait that long.
Shaukat Qadir is a retired brigadier general of the Pakistani Army.
