Will the Olympics Change China?

Posted August 7, 2008

Intersection of the Beijing Olympics with the Chinese public’s well-organized response to the Sichuan earthquake has sparked extensive speculation that China may be on the cusp of a major political reform. Some believe it could even be a step or two closer now to democratization. Sadly, such speculation does not consider certain crucial facts in the current trajectory of Chinese political development, which is by no means democratic.

The logic of the positive story goes something like this: Because of the Internet, integration into global affairs (exemplified by the Olympics), and three decades of rapid economic growth, Chinese society has changed fundamentally. People are now willing and able to organize for the purpose of helping their fellow citizens in distress—even strangers in other provinces—and to unite in the pursuit of large-scale public projects designed to bring glory to their nation.

This can only mean that a genuine civil society has taken shape, which in any case always occurs when a country’s per capita income reaches a certain (high-ish) level. And once a civil society is in place, democratization is eventually inevitable. Civil society development has indeed been crucial to democratization in other countries, but the problem with applying such logic to China is three-fold:

First, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still refuses to recognize the legitimacy of civic groups’ ultimate autonomy—and this in spite of the fact it promised political liberalization in exchange for the right to host the Olympics. The Party took quick command of earthquake relief efforts after the first chaotic 48 hours and eventually began arresting critics who complained about the quality of school construction. For civil society to become consolidated and lay the groundwork for democratization, it must first be recognized as legitimate by the authoritarian power-holders. Some in the CCP might be willing to move in this direction, but the key elites all assert that civil-society groups’ proper political role is to assist the local governments as underlings and consultants.

Second, in cases of successful democratization, activist civil society groups are almost always supported by pro-democratic new middle classes. In China, there certainly is a new middle (and upper) class; one good indicator is the 220 million people who now access the Internet regularly. But 220 million is still only one-sixth of the country’s huge population. Many of these people feel mortified at the prospect of democratization because it would imply turning over the reins of ultimate power to the five-sixths of the population who are relatively poor and uneducated. How can such people be trusted to elect wise and responsible leaders?

China’s prosperous urbanites feel altruism toward their disadvantaged compatriots, but they don’t think the poor should be empowered. They should be assisted in various ways, and subjected to fairer treatment. They should be treated to grand spectacles like the Olympics so they can forget their troubles for awhile and take pride in their country. But they should not be given voting and other civic rights because they would surely use them to elect demagogues and know-nothings who would destroy middle-class prosperity.

Third, the CCP has succeeded in cultivating in the minds of many of those benefiting from the current order the notion that democratization is a plot hatched by the West and Japan to bring disorder and chaos to China for the purpose of halting its peaceful rise. China’s new middle classes are fiercely patriotic. They relish the thought of putting “little Japan” in its place; of unifying Taiwan; and of catching up with the U.S. in “comprehensive national power.” When the CCP points to Russia and contends that democratization would lead to chaos, or to India and the Philippines and argues that it would slow economic growth, many in the new middle classes are persuaded. How could the dream of restoring China to world greatness or even global centrality succeed if the country were to accept the West’s advice and follow in the footsteps of Russia, India and the Philippines?

China is, in short, a very different country from such successful Asian democracies as Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. In these places, the former authoritarian state’s control was never so complete that it could prevent the emergence of genuinely autonomous civic groups. Moderates among the authoritarian elites became willing to work with moderates in civil society jointly to pursue controlled but significant political change.

At the same time, Taiwan’s, South Korea’s, and Thailand’s new middle classes did not, for the most part, fear the political participation of the poor and uneducated. Many saw liberal political change as the ultimate solution to poverty and backwardness. Finally, almost no one in these newer democracies worried that liberalization was a Western plot designed to prevent their country’s glorious rise in world affairs.

In short, China is embarked upon a substantially different developmental trajectory from that of its democratic neighbors. CCP elites expect to remain in power indefinitely into the future, perfecting their authoritarian system by suppressing corruption, increasing efficiency, and enhancing responsiveness to people’s needs. The eventual result will not necessarily be an authoritarian megapower threatening its neighbors or the U.S.-although such an outcome can’t be ruled out.

The key point is simply that if current trends hold, China’s future will not be democratic. Neither all of the hullabaloo surrounding the Olympics nor the Sichuan earthquake response significantly alters China’s developmental trajectory. The sooner the world recognizes this fact, the sooner we can all begin preparing for the real Chinese future.

Mr. Lynch, associate professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, is the author of “ Rising China and Asian Democratization,” out in paperback by Stanford University Press this month.