Change the U.S. Can Believe In

Posted August 20, 2009

Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will almost certainly lose power in the upcoming Aug. 30 general election, and some Americans are nervous.

A devastating economic recession has rocked Japan, while the LDP has become increasingly identified in the eyes of many Japanese voters with stagnation, scandal, and ineffective governance. Much of Japan’s dissatisfied population has found a home in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), an amalgamation of politicians from across Japan’s political spectrum who primarily agree on one thing: the LDP must be defeated.

If recent polls are remotely accurate, Japan is set to get only its second non-LDP prime minister in 53 years. A DPJ victory will bring to power several players who Americans largely do not know and who have made some disconcerting statements about foreign policy. Broadly speaking, the DPJ has advocated a more “independent” foreign policy in which Japan and the United States are “more equal” allies. DPJ powerbroker Ichiro Ozawa recently commented “it will be the age of Asia, and in that context it is important for Japan to have its own stance, to play its role in the region.”

These rather vague platitudes and more specific comments from some DPJ leaders have driven concern in America that the DPJ will seek to radically change the nature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in order to highlight Japanese independence. Several issues will probably dominate the DPJ’s first months: amending the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), canceling or re-examining Japan’s refueling of navy ships in the Indian Ocean in support of operations in Afghanistan, renegotiating financial support for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam, and gradually reducing America’s overall military footprint in Japan.

While the concerns of some Americans are justifiable and prudent given the importance of the Alliance, a close analysis of the DPJ’s domestic political environment upon taking office suggests that significant change in Japan’s foreign policy in the coming year is unlikely. Taking these realities into account, these changes may turn out to be essential for the long-term viability of the Alliance.

Moving to the Middle

Despite its provocative statements in the past, the DPJ has several reasons to moderate its approach to foreign policy and the Alliance. Most importantly, American policy makers should understand that past (and contemporary) statements cannot be separated from old-fashioned electioneering.

When the LDP was in power, the DPJ was unrestrained in its criticisms and unapologetic in its opposition. Many of the planks of this policy, such as being less deferential to the United States, contributing to international security through the United Nations, and modernizing Japan’s bureaucracy to prioritize the rights of citizens and taxpayers, are equal parts foreign policy principles and thinly-veiled electoral criticisms of the LDP.

Indeed, the DPJ should be understood as motivated primarily by domestic issues. The DPJ’s 2009 “manifesto,” the equivalent to a U.S. party’s platform begins with five “pledges” – reforming the government budget, protecting families, education, medical care, pensions, bureaucratic decentralization, and economic revitalization – that are entirely domestic. This is a direct response to the LDP’s perceived irresponsiveness to the needs of Japan’s citizens, not popular outrage disagreement with its foreign policy decisions.

Indeed, even though the DPJ has made significant gains in recent elections, this is not a sign of an ideological swing to the left by the Japanese voting public but rather a rejection of what they saw as LDP ineptitude. Going forward, DPJ leaders will have to make compromises between diverse sets of ideological supporters while attempting to attract a large and moderate middle. The DPJ in the end will be driven to the center by the prime directive of democratic politics: above all else, get re-elected.

Another force pushing the DPJ to the middle is the very nature of its composition. The DPJ is composed of a breathtakingly diverse set of politicians, from far-left Socialists and former Communists to right-leaning LDP exiles. These groups represent radically different approaches to foreign policy, and in the months following an election DPJ leadership will be focused on keeping its coalition together. Keeping the coalition together will mean avoiding divisive issues such as foreign policy and the Alliance.

There are indications that this moderation in policy has already begun as the election has drawn closer and victory has become more certain. Past iterations of the DPJ’s manifesto have pledged to end Japan’s refueling of U.S. Navy ships in the Indian Ocean. Yet, the DPJ’s August 2009 manifesto was revised to drop the pledge, and committed Japan to take the initiative in eradicating terrorism and building peace in Afghanistan.

Affects on the Alliance

The U.S. should be under no illusions that change is coming. While the DPJ leaders will attempt to start things off on the right foot as they focus on solidifying their domestic political base, eventually they will come to Washington intent on making the Alliance reflect Japan’s position as a major international power. While difficult, this is a necessary step if the Alliance is going to stay healthy, strong, and relevant.

The Alliance was founded in 1960as a bulwark against the spread against Communism in East Asia. China had “fallen” to Communism eleven years previous, America had fought a bloody and inconclusive war in Korea, Japan was still reeling from the catastrophe of World War II, and Washington was concerned about nascent Communist movements in Southeast Asia.

Now, Communism is finished in all but the official writings of governments in Beijing and Hanoi and Japan is the world’s second-largest economy. Yet, the Alliance remains in many ways stuck in the Cold War. It is not an equal, or nearly equal, relationship one would expect from the world’s two largest economies. Rather, Japan remains largely dependent on the U.S. for its self-defense, and its military remains constrained by its pacifist constitution. While Japan has supported U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has done so grudgingly and after much gnashing of teeth. From the DPJ’s perspective, agreements on cost-sharing for the realignment of forces out of Okinawa and the treatment of American military personnel convicted of crimes are overly favorable to the United States and ignore legitimate Japanese interests and concerns.

The reality is that with the DPJ in power, the U.S. is eventually going to have to revisit painful negotiations and will probably end up paying more than was originally planned. At times, Japan is going to say “no.” As difficult as it will be, Washington will have to adjust its expectations of what Japan is willing to do as an alliance partner, and will have to spend a great deal of time and political capital justifying its requests to the Japanese public.

Yet, Washington should also make it clear to Tokyo that change will affect both sides. Radically changing the nature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance is much easier to contemplate when one is in the opposition party and the only impact of your words is in poll numbers; taking the reins of power has the tendency to moderate campaign promises. Moreover, if the DPJ wants to Japan to be a more equal partner in the Alliance, it will have to take a greater responsibility for its own self-defense. This will mean an increased defense budget, and a more active support for collective self-defense.

Change can be painful, and this will no doubt be the case in the future of the Alliance. But change can also be transformative, and a more equal relationship with a more capable Japan will be a net positive for American interests and regional stability.

Abraham Denmark is a Fellow and Director of its Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.