North Korea Goes Nuclear, Again
by James L. Schoff
Posted September 25, 2008
This week North Korea expelled United Nations monitors from key nuclear facilities and announced that it will soon restart its plutonium-producing reactor, which was being slowly dismantled as part of a compromise agreement with the United States under the so-called six-party talks framework. North Korea’s excuse for reneging on its side of the bargain is a complaint that the United States is demanding a draconian verification process that Pyongyang believes is unacceptable. The six-party talks are in trouble, and if North Korea goes further to kick-out international inspectors from the country and restart the reactor, then we are back to square one with difficult decisions to make.
Although some have accused the U.S. of acting too much like a prosecutor in the six-party talks, trying to force North Korea to prove its nuclear innocence, in fact the metaphor of a “trial” can be a useful way to guide near-term steps. The various six-party agreements and implementation plans hammered out in the last few years are not treaties or legal documents, and no international judge is going to decide who bears responsibility for perceived failures…but there is a jury, made up of the other four parties (South Korea, China, Japan and Russia). Ultimately, this jury will significantly influence the outcome of the six-party talks, by passing judgment (however passively and incrementally) on what constitutes an appropriate compromise between Washington and Pyongyang on the basic parameters of denuclearization and their near-term bilateral relationship.
The role of this “jury” was evident during negotiations over the September 2005 Joint Statement that included reference to the possible future provision of a light-water reactor to North Korea, as well as the eventual lifting of de facto sanctions against the BDA bank in Macau (in both cases, the U.S. compromised when the consensus of the “jury” was against it). It was also this way following North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 when U.N. sanctions were imposed and the hardened positions of the five versus North Korea helped pave the way for an initial implementation agreement in February 2007. There have been other instances of the “jury’s” pivotal role.
Under the “action-for-action” principle that guides these talks, actions are valuable currency in this process…but they are a poorly defined currency. What is a “whole” action? When has one party short-changed the other? North Korea submitted a nuclear declaration to the six-party chair and it expects the removal of certain sanctions in return. But isn’t verification of that declaration actually an integral part of North Korea’s promised action in the first place? Isn’t Washington justified to ask for “internationally standard” procedures for verification in return for completing its action? How will we decide what is fair, who is right, and what’s an acceptable level of risk and ambiguity in this process? Ultimately, the “jury” will decide, and consequently each party tries to make its case.
The six-party talks by themselves are not a true forum for negotiating the terms of North Korean denuclearization. It is the concept of the six-party talks that gives shape and purpose to all of the shuttle diplomacy that takes place (especially the U.S.-North Korea bilateral component), and the talks serve as a valuable point of reference to which the parties keep trying to return. Moreover, the six-party framework exists beyond the actual plenary meetings. The potential for a five-versus-one dynamic is always there, if one country isolates itself too much within this process, and the mere knowledge of this possibility can act as a deterrent to such self-imposed isolation. In this way, we might consider the six-party talks as a “functioning concept” of multilateral dialogue, negotiation, and mediation, if not an actual forum. In this way, bilateral, trilateral, and even five-party meetings can be a productive component of the six-party talks. Within this jury, the opinions of the Republic of Korea and China are particularly important.
It is true that the six-party process has failed to prevent escalation when the talks break down or go into recess, though they are somewhat effective at moderating the reaction when the middle players balance against the escalating state if it is deemed to be going too far. An offended party expects that egregious moves by another will be countered by the other four parties, reducing the need for it to take unilateral action, which would only further inflame the situation. Similarly, the framework has been more reassuring to U.S. allies than a strictly bilateral (U.S.-N.K.) format. There might come a time when either the United States or North Korea will decide that the six-party talks no longer serve its interests and that it is better off outside of the process rather than inside, but to date the prospect of five-versus-one pressure in that scenario has been enough to support modest achievements.
North Korea is making a big mistake if it discards this process now, and the meeting of world leaders this week at the U.N. General Assembly is the perfect opportunity for the jury to deliver a preview of its verdict and warn Pyongyang against walking away. Washington has a right to expect the application of international verification standards in North Korea as part of the nuclear declaration “action.” Perhaps the U.S. negotiators are asking for too much on this front, and if so the jury will moderate this request. That is the value of the six-party process.
Let there be arguments and compromises on the margins regarding the details, but remember that denuclearization has to have solid credibility if it is to lead to diplomatic normalization and constructive peace regime development in Korea. America and its allies in the region will demand it, and I think that the rest of the jury understands this. We just have to find this common ground…issue by issue…point by point…action for action.
James L. Schoff is associate director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge, Mass., and co-author of “Nuclear Matters in North Korea: Building a Multilateral Response for Future Stability in Northeast Asia” (Potomac Books, 2008).
