Talking With the Taliban

Posted November 3, 2008

Even though the American establishment is still not prepared to consider the possibility that the all-powerful U.S. military could be defeated by a handful of ragtag militants, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen's bold confession to the U.S. Congress that “America might be losing the war” and that “it was time to consider other strategic options” forced a rethink. It was inevitable that, amongst other options, initiating a dialogue with the Taliban would come under consideration.

Since the U.S. is certainly not going to consider a dialogue with al Qaeda, the Taliban were the only other option. Hamid Karzai, the lame-duck president of Afghanistan, has for some time been advocating this option and recently made a public offer to Taliban leader Mullah Omar to “return to his own people” and offered to negotiate a political power-sharing formula.

The British have been desperately trying to find a way out of the mess that their alliance with the U.S. in Afghanistan has dragged them into; and finally managed to convince their ally to at least open up a dialogue with the Taliban, with Saudi Arabia hosting the negotiations.

It appears that the U.S. is interested in getting the Taliban leadership to betray its ally, al Qaeda, and provide U.S. forces with identities and locations, in return for which the Taliban would not only receive amnesty but also be permitted to again play a role in the corridors of Afghan power.

The question arises, why should the Taliban betray a trusted and proven ally who has stood by them through thick and thin and provided them financial resources to ally themselves with an Afghan government that is virtually on its knees and the Americans who, the Taliban believe, are intent on wiping them off the face off the earth?

It would be fair to assume, therefore, that the Taliban will open negotiations with a view to see how they can accelerate the U.S. defeat and not with the intent of forming a genuine alliance. The Americans are not fools either, and are likely to have considered the likelihood of such an eventuality. The Taliban will also be aware of the fact that they will need to establish their credibility.

Let us assume that the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership decide on betraying some of their dubious and peripheral allies they feel are expendable, particularly those who are willing to initiate genuine negotiations with Pakistan, and provide the U.S. with their identities and locations. What we will then have will be the classic game of diplomacy-intelligence, with double and triple agents—none knowing whom to trust.

Let us assume further that after a cursory confirmation of their identity and role, the U.S., unilaterally, decides to take them out. The consequences for Pakistan, while not disastrous, will be a serious setback, since extremists will be able to claim that the U.S. wants this war to continue, because it is exterminating all those willing to negotiate with Pakistan.

In this process, some of the al Qaeda midlevel operatives will also begin to lose confidence in their own leadership, fearing their eventual betrayal. Some will try harder to prove their loyalty to their organization, while others might wish to change sides—adding to the complications of the intelligence game being played.

The problem with this whole situation is that the side that will succeed is the one with superior intelligence. The U.S. clearly believes its intelligence organization is far superior, due to its vastly superior electronic intelligence. However, in the kind of terrain where these people are operating, electronic intelligence is useless, unless human intelligence provides it a direction; and in human intelligence the Taliban and al Qaeda are far superior.

For the Americans to infiltrate the Taliban will take time to cultivate individuals, who will then need to establish their credibility by committing acts of terrorism alongside their newfound friends—it is a dirty game and a time consuming one; it took the British a decade to infiltrate the IRA. For the U.S., it is like putting their hand into murky waters, known to have Piranha. The U.S. might seem to be the initial gainer, but in the long run is likely to recreate the very uncertainties it is beset with today.

Finally, it is unlikely that the world will ever see the return of the pre-Soviet-invasion, united Afghanistan. The new Afghanistan is more likely to be a confederation with a number of political power centers. If that be so, there can be nothing more dangerous for the region, particularly Pakistan, than that some of these power centers be Taliban-controlled. In such an eventuality, Pakistan would never be able to eliminate its own Taliban.

Shaukat Qadir is a retired brigadier general of the Pakistani Army.