Defense as Diplomacy
by Shaukat Qadir
Posted January 3, 2009
Defense and diplomacy are tied by an umbilical cord; neither one can effectively function without support from the other. Even as last month’s attacks in Mumbai were unfolding the Indian media had decided that the perpetrators were Pakistanis and the Indian government did not take long to follow suit.
The Pakistani government and people hastened to express their sympathy, but hardly had the terrorists been killed or apprehended and already the Indian government had begun to threaten unilateral action against Pakistani citizens a la U.S. intrusions into the Pakistani tribal areas.
We, in Pakistan, learnt of the military options under consideration from the Indian media; while the Indian foreign minister continued to assert that “all options are open” and that “India has the right to defend itself by any means from attacks launched by citizens of another country.”
Unusually wisely, the Pakistan government responded with restraint and the Pakistani foreign minister had to be pushed to the wall by journalists to force him into mildly responding, “We are hoping for the best but are prepared for the worst.
Most analysts in Pakistan were fully conscious that the ruling Congress Party was milking this opportunity, not only to spike the BJP’s guns and gain as much domestic ground as it could in the run up to the elections—which it did, as demonstrated by its sweeping the first of the three state elections, including Delhi, which every Indian analyst had predicted that the Congress Party would lose; but also, inspired by the international reaction following the 1999 clash in Kashmir, known as the Kargil conflict, and the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, was again seeking to isolate Pakistan.
But this time, while achieving its domestic objectives, India miscalculated the international reaction. The international community is fully conscious that Pakistan is fighting the cancer of terrorism in its midst and that many of those terrorists were funded by outsiders from Saudi Arabia, like Osama bin Laden, and even the U.S. during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is also aware that Pakistan is critically important to the world-wide war against terrorism; in fact, it is generally accepted that Pakistan has replaced the U.S. as al Qaeda’s “enemy No. 1.” Any attempt to destabilize Pakistan could, therefore, result in advancing the cause of the terrorists.
Consequently, the initial wave of sympathy for the dastardly acts in Mumbai was soon replaced by a rising concern regarding India’s aggressive policies mimicking the U.S. policy of going after terrorists wherever they may be. Even as Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, “War is not an option,” his foreign minister was saying, “All options are open.”
Then came news that India had moved some of its air assets to forward bases—followed soon after by news that Pakistan’s air space had been violated, which was probably an aggressive “air patrol,” intended to test Pakistan’s response time. Within days of this, the Indian media reported the deployment of Indian forces around Jaisalmer, close to the southern border, where, at Rahim Yar Khan, Pakistan is vulnerable because the main transportation artery is very near the border.
Meantime Pakistan, even without being provided any tangible evidence, took pre-emptive measures to place possible suspects under arrest, many of whom had not yet been accused by India. But domestic pressure was mounting for some kind of response to India’s saber-rattling.
Pakistan’s first military response was placing the air force on “red alert,” which was demonstrated by defensive patrolling of our borders for two days; followed by moving an armored brigade and support elements, including armored infantry elements, to a location close to Sulaimanke Headworks.
This is reminiscent of 1986 when, under the guise of an exercise nicknamed “Operation Brass Tacks,” India amassed troops, though in far greater numbers, intending to strike RahimYar Khan. That time too Pakistan moved an armored and an infantry division to the same location where they could threaten the Indian lines of communication to the troops in the south. This ended “Brass Tacks” and resulted in a sudden desire in the Indian government to defuse tensions—which we are witnessing again today.
Shaukat Qadir is a retired brigadier general of the Pakistani Army.
