Hu Jintao's visit to Japan this week marks a recent acme in the fitful relationship between China and Japan since they first resumed diplomatic ties in 1972. That year THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW reported on then Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's historic trip to Beijing and the resulting joint communiqué, which re-established diplomatic ties between the two countries. Here are three articles from our archives that report and comment on Tanaka's trip and the implications of re-engagement with China.

Japan: Opening Moves

Reference: Vol. 77, No. 40, 30 Sep 1972, Focus 31

By Koji Nakamura

This week the leaders of two of Asia's most formidable powers met to declare their intention to end the state of war between them and to exchange ambassadors; the preconditions for a profound mutation in Pacific Basin affairs are now in existence. For Japan, the challenge will be to create a policy which differs fundamentally from past reliance on Washington, with the assumptions about China which were built into it.

A substantial change in the attitude towards Japan of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. is likely. And the major worry for Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's team in formulating its policies towards China is, ironically, neither the People's Republic nor the U.S. but the Soviet Union. Russia has important contracts to offer Japanese companies in connection with the development of Siberia; Moscow, if displeased, might look elsewhere.

The Soviet leaders moved rapidly last year as the extent of pressure on the then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in favor of recognition of China became clear. The visit to Japan by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January, accompanied by offers to open talks for the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty, was interpreted here as a firm bid to dissuade post-Sato Japan from taking a positive line towards Peking.

By the summer, when it became clear to Moscow that the Tanaka government had crossed the Rubicon where China was concerned, Moscow's attitude to territorial issues, to be negotiated this autumn in preparatory talks covering the peace treaty, had stiffened. Pravda has recently published several articles aimed at destroying any "Japanese notion" that the reversion of the Etorofu and Kunashiri islands would now form part of the deal. And it has made known its desire for increased American (and therefore decreased Japanese) participation in the Siberian program.

Given the Soviet Union's attitude, Japan will find it difficult to formulate what Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira has called an "equal distance diplomacy" towards the big three. Ohira has implied that the Government recognizes that every sip of mao-tai decreases the flow of vodka.

"Equal distance" diplomacy also will require virtual dismantling of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which Washington will resist both for the part it plays in meeting U.S. defense commitments to South Korea and Taiwan and because it is seen in many circles in America as an instrument preventing Japan from "turning to communism or returning to militarism," as one senior official put it.

Perhaps the only way for Japan to achieve an independent diplomacy vis-à-vis all three powers would be through the negotiation of a four-power non-aggression pact embracing China, the U.S., the Soviet Union and Japan. Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki has pointed to such a treaty as the principal vehicle for preserving peace in Asia; and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has long advocated such an arrangement "when peace is established between Peking and Tokyo." But China will have to escort, by this means, a hesitant Japan out from under the "'nuclear umbrella"; Tokyo is unlikely to make the first move.

The Price of Rapprochement

Reference: Vol. 78, No. 41, Oct. 7 1972 

By this stage in Asia's history, peace at any price between its major powers such as China and Japan, or India and Pakistan, is worth a lot. Criticism can be leveled at Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for the desperate speed with which he sought to silence the elements whose demands for accommodation with Peking had become the dominant influence in the Tokyo political world. But these strictures, to some extent, must be set against the benefits which the region as a whole can expect to reap from the success of the Sino-Japanese summit.

Although China has been admitted to the world family of nations through its membership of the UN and its recognition by formerly unwilling countries (including the acceptance of Peking's claims to be the rightful Government of China implied by President Nixon's visit in February) China has still not been embraced as an equal member of the Asian region.

India remains resentful of China because of the 1962 border war and the Red Guard violence involving its diplomats in 1967. Indonesia is still suspicious of China's intentions following the abortive communist coup in 1965. President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines has made an anti-communist stand an integral part of his political posture now that he has imposed martial law. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand continue to entertain considerable doubts about the Chinese Government because of its support for "people's liberation movements" while guerillas and subversive groups are still active on their soil. Bangladesh is denounced by Peking as the illegitimate offspring of collusion between New Delhi and the Kremlin.

The Unresolved Issues

Against this background, the speed with which Tanaka and Chou En-lai were able to find a formula to normalize relations and exchange ambassadors carries high hopes, even though such explosive issues as Japanese economic ties with Taiwan and Japan's claims to the Senkakus were left unresolved. Tanaka's discussions proved that a nation can come to terms with Peking before settling all the disputes that may exist between an Asian country and the People's Republic. This demonstration of what direct talks with the Chinese can produce may well prove to be the most profitable result of Tanaka's visit as far as the region as a whole is concerned.

The credit balance of the Peking-Tokyo accord is easy enough to calculate. Neither Japan nor China are willing to speak frankly about the costs. Nevertheless the price paid may turn out to be so high that it cannot be ignored. Even before Tanaka set out for the Chinese capital a certain degree of disillusionment with China had already begun to emerge in Tokyo.

Disclaiming Interference

The downfall of former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and his replacement by Tanaka had been dramatic events in Japanese political life; increasingly they are being interpreted as the direct result of the Chinese offensive to ensure the formation of a government more responsive to Peking's demands than previous administrations. Such intervention in another country's domestic politics is hardly calculated to win China friends over the long run, particularly after repeated Chinese disclaimers of any desire to interfere with the internal affairs of other states.

In addition the Prime Minister of China, in defiance of his own country's rigid protocol conventions, failed to toast the Head of State of Japan at both the official banquet given for the Japanese Prime Minister and the dinner to which Chou was invited in return by Tanaka. Tanaka permitted his Emperor to be ignored while his own health was drunk by the Chinese Prime Minister. Chou's pointed refusal to take public note of the status of the Japanese Emperor was perhaps less serious than Tanaka's readiness to be treated as if he were his country's head of state.

For a nation as proud and patriotic as the Japanese, the manner in which Tanaka was brought to power with the help of the pro-China lobby and his toleration of a lack of respect for his Emperor are not trifles. They must affect, eventually, Tanaka's own reputation as a worthy head of the Japanese Government.

The Japanese turned against the U.S, out of anger at the unfair treatment Tokyo believed it was receiving at Washington's hands, and the way the Americans appeared to regard Japan as a permanent military base—both issues which touched the country's self-esteem. In the same way the Japanese could well begin to feel they have been excessively humiliated by the Chinese. In a situation of such delicacy it behoves Peking to abandon in future any activities that could appear to belittle the status of Japan or provoke a patriotic backlash of anti-Chinese sentiment, which would serve the interests of no one, either in Asia or the rest of the world.

Foreign Policy: A Consistent Zigzag

Reference: Vol. 77, No. 40, 30 Sep 1972, Focus 3 

By Cheng Huan

At the heart of China's rapprochement, first with the United States, and then with its ancient enemy, Japan, lies the determination of Peking to isolate Taiwan from the rest of the world. Much of the accelerated diplomatic thrust by China during the past year can be explained in terms of this desire to destroy Taiwan's credibility. As Chiang Kai-shek is forced to lose face, so the smiles of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai broaden.

China in 1972, as during centuries of unforgotten history, continues to be obsessed with national and racial unity. This makes it all the harder for Peking to forget that China was denied its UN seat for 22 years because of Chiang Kai-shek's insistence that Taipei is the capital of China until the communist "menace" has been removed from Peking.

The Cultural Revolution of 1966-69 finally and effectively enforced Peking's control over all China except perhaps for certain border regions like Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. And China's first veto in the Security Council against the admission of Bangladesh was primarily intended as a reminder that it would to1erate no local or regional Separatism.

With the Cultural Revolution's upheavals ended Peking was at last able to devote its energies to foreign policies. Spurred by increased Russian hostility culminating in the border clashes of 1969, and the first relaxations in trade and travel connections with the United States, Peking opted for ping-pong diplomacy. The dividends have been greater than could ever have been expected. Suddenly China found queues of diplomatic suitors at the door and, in an atmosphere of international euphoria which surprised even Chou, China last October replaced Taiwan at the United Nations. Chou's diplomatic offensive had quickly to be rushed into top gear for, as he himself said, China was "not prepared" for UN recognition in 1971.

Taipei's brave public reaction has not been able to hide Chiang Kai-shek's obvious shocked sense of failure as more and more of his "friends" desert to the other side. Japan's Premier Kakuei Tanaka arrived in Peking this week with the firm intention of establishing diplomatic relations with China. And the final communiqué made clear Japan's willingness to concede that Taiwan is part of China—thus ultimately confirming its future as part of the Chinese mainland.

The next and final stages in the isolating of Taiwan are certain, however, to be the most painful. Peking may maintain that Taiwan is a domestic problem, but there is still a deep awareness that final settlement of Taiwan's status will have international repercussions, if only because of its major socio-economic progress and potential for self-sufficiency. Taiwan is viewed from Peking as a dangerous cancerous growth that must be cut out lest it poison the rest of China. Russian interests in the island are adding to Peking's concern; it remembers that Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir apparent, Chiang Ching-kuo, has a Russian wife and, reportedly, distinct pro-Soviet leanings.

The claims behind the two prongs of Chou En-lai's new diplomacy, disclaiming "superpower" status while befriending the Third World, are in danger of contradicting each other. To many observers China already, with its veto of Bangladesh and its ruthless insistence on the removal of Taiwan's name from every UN document, is behaving like a "superpower." Simultaneously, Peking has made increased efforts to expand contacts with countries like Malta, Mauritius, Zambia, Guyana, Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Sudan, all of which have found China championing their political aspirations, entertaining them lavishly and providing generous economic aid.

It is also revealing that China's foreign policy offensive has been almost totally aimed at far-away countries to the exclusion of neighboring Southeast Asia. Somewhat hesitant, trade, cultural or diplomatic overtures made by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have been graciously received by Peking with obvious reluctance. Limited support for North Vietnam, the continued presence of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Peking and support for the re-unification of the Koreas look paltry when compared with China's eager involvement in Europe, Africa and the Latin American countries.

Droves of French, German, Dutch, British and Italian visitors to China are highlighting Peking's particular interest in the European Economic Community both as a political counterbalance to Russian and American influence, and as a large potential market for Chinese goods. In the East European bloc, only Hungary and Poland seem seriously to have improved relations with Peking. Czechoslovakia's venomous attacks against China continue unabated; in June it scolded China "for allowing Western industrialists to exploit millions of Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao in order to fill Peking banks with gold ." While the relationship with Albania seems markedly to have cooled, new ambassadors were exchanged with East Germany in June, and trade with Yugoslavia has increased at an impressive rate.

Proof that China means to concentrate its efforts at the UN towards the developing countries should be seen in the choice of diplomats now representing China there; both Chiao Kuan-hua, leader of the UN team and Huang Hua, China's permanent representative, have extensive experience of African and Asian affairs. Huang Hua particularly is an authority on Africa, and was the only Chinese ambassador to retain his post, in Cairo, during the Cultural Revolution. It is also significant that China now has five new deputy foreign ministers, all of whom possess extensive knowledge of the politics of the Third World. And during the past two years alone China has negotiated trade and aid agreements with some 24 African states, notably with Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia. It is likely that the two new civil air agreements with Ethiopia will be extended to the rest of Africa as China's international air routes take shape.

The success of Chinese diplomatic efforts in Africa was demonstrated by the voting pattern in the United Nations last year when Taiwan was expelled. Of the 27 African countries which voted against Taiwan, twelve had either voted for Tai-wan or else abstained in the 1970 debate…

The rub is that Peking, for all its support of national liberation movements, also wishes to improve relations with the world's thoroughly capitalist states; it can see no reason why one should cancel out the other. Chinese foreign policy, like that of any country, is essentially based on principles of self-interest, and if it is in China's interest to lead the Third World away from reliance on the superpowers while simultaneously establishing closer relations with the US, Japan and Europe, nothing will stop Peking pursuing a zigzag course. Mao himself has written that "Any ideology—even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself—is ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people."

To what extent foreign policy considerations, such as the rapprochement with the U.S., were responsible for the Lin Piao crisis is not known. What is certain, is that Russia will be of crucial importance to Chinese diplomacy at least in the next year, and maybe for decades. The security of China's borders with the Soviet Union is causing great concern in Peking, especially now that a third of Russia's armed forces are permanently stationed near those borders. Analysts have given various reasons for such a large concentration of Russian troops, but there is now a new one—that Russia means to take advantage of a disturbed internal situation in China following Mao's death. On the other hand, Chou has more than shown himself to be a man who believes in letting old differences die. It would be characteristic of China's present diplomatic profile for Chou to cap his detente with the U.S. and Japan with an all-forgiving piece of pragmatism that will result in an accommodation with Moscow.