Posted May 7, 2008

When tropical Cyclone Nargis ripped into southern Burma on May 3, it wrought untold havoc throughout much of the country. Early indications are that more than 22,000 lives were lost in five of Burma’s 14 divisions and states—Irrawaddy, Rangoon, Pegu, Mon and Karen. In Bogalay, in the heart of the Irrawaddy delta, 10,000 people died when a tidal surge 3.5 meters high destroyed 95% of the town’s houses. Across the many affected areas, 41,000 people are still missing. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that the toll on human life could soon escalate. In towns and villages devastated by the storm, electricity supplies have been cut, water is contaminated, food is scarce, and up to one million people are living without shelter.

The immediate concern is to respond adequately to the developing humanitarian crisis in southern Burma. While the military government has stated publicly that it would welcome international aid, it is not yet clear what it means by that. Already fears are being expressed that stringent controls the ruling generals habitually place on external agencies may not be entirely relaxed for the emergency relief effort. Even in normal circumstances, it is difficult to channel assistance from the outside world to Burmese towns and villages. In the extreme situation now facing the country, when infrastructure in many isolated parts has been largely destroyed, it is essential that both the regime and aid agencies make strenuous attempts to work together.

In the longer run, the issue that many are starting to think about is how a tragedy on this scale might alter political dynamics inside, and indeed outside, Burma. To date, the junta remains committed to holding a constitutional referendum on May 10 in most of the country, and on May 24 in areas directly affected by the cyclone. If the generals succeed in securing public support through their plebiscite, they will move forward to a 2010 general election designed to usher into being an authoritarian “discipline-flourishing democracy.” Burma will then have a political system in which the military remains the dominant political power, but some elements of civil participation and governance are permitted.

However, what until very recently looked like a tightly controlled unfolding of the junta’s self-styled roadmap to democracy now begins to look rather different. Not only the date of the referendum, but also its outcome, have been thrown into question. Furthermore, while it seems likely that the junta will still find a way to get public endorsement for its constitution, the political landscape is no longer as predictable as it would like. The sheer magnitude of the disaster that has befallen the country, allied with perceived government incompetence in responding to it, have fundamentally reshaped Burmese politics.

Nonetheless, a scenario in which the military regime collapses and the country embarks on an inclusive transition to democracy embracing political parties and ethnic groups long excluded from power remains improbable. For half a century, the military has been so pervasive in national politics, and competing institutions have been so weak, that such a sequence of events is a distant dream. By contrast, the possibility that the junta, for many years prickly, stubborn and isolated, will be forced to reach out across ideological and ethnic divides to stabilize and reconstruct the country is distinct and real.

It is to this possibility that the outside world should direct its efforts. The task now is not to berate the junta for its manifold failings past and present. Rather, it is to use the opening afforded by national tragedy to build bridges into and out of the army that has for so long ruled the land. Through new links, the generals can be bound to key stakeholders within the country and without. Through fresh contacts, top leaders can be persuaded that the primary responsibility of all parties is to work collectively for the benefit of Burma as a whole, and not for any particular group or faction. In varied ways, confidence in joining hands with others can grow on all sides so that the country first emerges from national disaster, and then starts to chart a new course.

In spearheading such efforts the United Nations, much maligned for its inability to force change on a junta that responded with brutal repression to monk-led popular protests last September, remains the essential institution. The U.N. can and should coordinate relief efforts, at least attempt to bring different sectors of Burmese society together (the military, opposition groups, ethnic groups) and build an external coalition of support for this sort of collaborative strategy.

Cyclone Nargis is an unprecedented human catastrophe for Burma. Although the full extent of its devastation is not yet known, it is already clear that the country has suffered hugely. However, at this time of great human tragedy, all sides have a chance to come together in the cause of genuine national renewal. It is around a collaborative agenda of this kind that those who wish Burma well should cohere.

Mr. Holliday is dean of social sciences at the University of Hong Kong and a frequent commentator on Burma.