Posted March 12, 2008

Tuesday's twin bombings in Pakistan's cultural capital Lahore served as a reminder of the constant threat faced by this frontline state in the global war on terrorism. The bombings that claimed 32 lives and left over 150 injured came two days after the opposition parties, which won overwhelming support in parliamentary elections held on Feb. 18, agreed to form a coalition government. Cooperation between his opponents poses a serious threat to the political survival of President Pervez Musharraf. The prospect of an elected government, backed by Pakistan's people, taking the reins of power is also not encouraging for jihadi extremists, who have so far benefited from the gulf between the Pakistani people and their government.

Since 9/11, the Bush administration has considered Gen. Musharraf an important ally in stabilizing Pakistan and waging war against terrorists. But Gen. Musharraf's performance as an anti-terrorist ally has been imperfect at best. Lacking legitimacy at home, he has carefully calibrated efforts against terrorism to ensure continued international backing, especially from the United States. The war against terror has been waged in fits and starts and without a comprehensive strategy. Gen. Musharraf has also made a major blunder by creating the perception that Pakistan must fight terrorists to protect itself against American pressure.

Gen. Musharraf's domestic political opponents include myriad groups, most of them just as opposed to terrorism. Pakistan’s largest political party–the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) formerly led by the late Benazir Bhutto–has taken the bold stance that Pakistan must fight the war on terrorism for its own sake and not only to avoid U.S. pressure or to obtain U.S. aid. In the last few months before her death at the hands of terrorists, Ms. Bhutto publicly criticized all terrorist groups in Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf, on the other hand, has often made a distinction between foreign jihadis (like al Qaeda) and local extremists (like the Taliban), whom he treated differently in strategic terms.

Gen. Musharraf's mistake of allowing some jihadis to continue to organize while arresting al Qaeda suspects wanted by the U.S. enabled jihadi networks to survive and gain strength. Most counterterrorism experts agree that al Qaeda managed to regroup under the shadow of regional and local extremist networks and the Taliban, too, are now stronger than before. The Afghan Taliban have now been supplemented by an extremely deadly Pakistani Taliban movement that is believed to be behind most of the terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

Over the last year, the terrorists have been emboldened to attack Pakistan's security services. Military installations and operatives of intelligence agencies have been targeted with greater frequency. The latest attacks in Lahore were directed at the Federal Investigation Agency, Pakistan's equivalent of the U.S. FBI. In most cases, experts have been surprised by the quality of insider information available to the attackers. Most recent terrorist attacks have been timed to coincide with significant political developments such as elections, or in case of Tuesday’s attacks, the announcement of the coalition government.

The stepping up of the terrorists' campaign has corresponded with Gen. Musharraf’s waning fortunes. The Pakistani president, who took power in a 1999 military coup, appears increasingly beleaguered after a series of political blunders that began with his decision to dismiss Pakistan’s chief justice in March 2007.

As Gen. Musharraf appeared more out of touch with the sentiment of his own people, his decisions to arrest hundreds of lawyers and detain superior court judges have only deepened popular disapproval of his regime. After his party lost elections to the PPP and to the Pakistan Muslim League faction led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Gen. Musharraf's ability to maintain power has diminished. His weakness is emboldening the terrorists and the latest wave of attacks is probably aimed at undermining the resolve of a future democratic government to fight terrorism.

Gen. Musharraf is now an increasingly isolated figure, unable to command respect at home and incapable of inspiring awe or fear among insurgents and terrorists. The only hope for fighting terrorism in Pakistan effectively is for the elected government to take power quickly and develop as well as execute the comprehensive strategy against terrorism that the general never worked out.

Mr. Haqqani, a professor at Boston University, is co-chair of the Hudson Institute's Project on Islam and Democracy. He is the author of "Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military" (Carnegie Endowment, 2005) and served as an adviser to Benazir Bhutto.