Some observers are speculating that Ma Ying-jeou’s election as president of the Republic of China (ROC) means the end of identity politics in Taiwan and dramatically closer cross-Strait relations. Evidently, Taiwan’s voters reject the notion that their society’s future welfare is best served by baiting China and emphasizing ethnic differences among the ROC’s various communal groups (including Taiwanese, Mainlanders, Hakkas, and Aboriginals).

Mr. Ma’s victory probably does signal the bankruptcy of the radical de-Sinification movement promoted by President Chen Shui-bian, which increased ethnic tensions in Taiwan while infuriating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But a deeper aspect of Taiwanese identity—Taiwan zhuti yishi (“Taiwan-centric consciousness”)—not only remains alive and well, but was even confirmed and strengthened by Mr. Ma’s victory. Once realization of this fact sinks in, CCP elites will likely begin to find fault with President Ma (or his successor) and cross-Strait tensions will resume.

“Taiwan-centric consciousness” is the most common translation of Taiwan zhuti yishi, but is somewhat imprecise. The term zhuti literally means “main body” or “subject.” Taiwan zhuti yishi indicates the widely-shared consciousness on the island that Taiwan is an autonomous entity with a distinctive history and a right to determine its own future free from interference by foreign countries. Taiwan is in this sense a “subject,” directing its own course, not an object to be handed from one great power to another, or some other country’s peripheral territory. Taiwan-centric consciousness freely acknowledges that there is a Chinese dimension to Taiwan’s identity (along with a Japanese dimension, an Aboriginal dimension, and even a contemporary global dimension).

In this respect, it differs from radical de-Sinificationism, which rejects any association with China, and whose proponents sometimes argue that Taiwan should “cleanse” itself of those Chinese elements imposed on the island in decades and centuries past. Taiwan-centric consciousness is more self-confident and magnanimous. It accepts and even celebrates the Chinese dimension to Taiwan’s identity, but it conceives China to be in this way a part of Taiwan, rather than the other way around. Taiwan (the ROC) is an autonomous subject, just as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an autonomous subject.

As early as December 2004, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and even deeper-Green Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) of former President Lee Teng-hui were trounced in legislative elections, it was clear that radical de-Sinificationism did not resonate widely with Taiwan voters. President Chen nevertheless persisted in pursuing a de-Sinification agenda even as economic and other problems festered; key DPP leaders (including Mr. Chen himself) were accused of corruption; and relations with the United States and China deteriorated. All of these factors contributed to DPP candidate Frank Hsieh’s defeat. The DPP was perceived as playing games with de-Sinification while ignoring these wider, more pertinent issues.

But at the same time, Taiwan-centric consciousness slowly continued to strengthen during Mr. Chen’s presidency, and Mr. Ma had no choice but to embrace it if he wanted to win the presidency. Already by May 2000—the month President Chen first took office—polls indicated that a mere 23% of Taiwan’s citizens wanted unification with China either right away or the status quo now with unification later. By August 2007, the proportion favoring immediate or eventual unification had fallen to 14%. Some 53% preferred the status quo of de facto independence either indefinitely or with a decision to be made in the future, and 27% wanted de jure independence either immediately or eventually. (In May 2000, around 17% wanted immediate or eventual de jure independence).

Another poll indicated that in 2007, four out of five Taiwanese rejected the “one country, two systems” formula the PRC proposes for solving the “Taiwan problem.” Yet still other polls indicated that up to 80% of Taiwan citizens rejected the claim the ROC isn’t a sovereign country, or the notion that citizens of China should have a say in Taiwan’s future. Some 75% to 80% wanted to enter the United Nations under one name or another.

Ma Ying-jeou took a number of decisive steps to align his presidential campaign with Taiwan-centric consciousness. He began, as early as the mid-1990s, to learn to speak Taiwanese. Native speakers report that the results are mixed, but many express appreciation that Mr. Ma made the effort. Of more immediate political import, during the eight months preceding the election, Mr. Ma put some of his Taiwanese (and, to a lesser extent, Hakka) to use during a series of “long-stay” visits to various parts of the island where Mainlanders are few and where suspicion that a Mainlander president might sell Taiwan out was common. Candidate Ma sought to engage average voters during his long-stay visits, inquiring into their aspirations, concerns, and policy preferences. He sought to present himself as in-touch with the common man or woman, not an aloof Mainlander unconcerned about popular Taiwanese views. His long-stay visits were widely reported and evidently helped convince many Taiwanese that voting for Ma would be “safe.” He could be trusted; he could be distinguished from the dictatorial and aloof Mainlander leaders of the past and from the threatening figures who currently lead the CCP.

Mr. Ma also made a number of specific policy proclamations to align his candidacy with Taiwan-centric consciousness:

• He explicitly ruled out unification with China.
• He insisted on numerous occasions that the ROC (which even the DPP acknowledges is Taiwan’s official name) is already a sovereign country.
• He demanded as a precondition for peace talks that China not only stop insisting on unification, but also renounce the use of force—while removing the 1,000-1,400 missiles it currently has targeted on Taiwan.
• He demanded that Beijing allow Taiwan greater international space, by calling off its “full-court press” of recent years in which PRC officials arm-twist the ROC’s dwindling corps of diplomatic allies into switching recognition, and by finding a formula under which Taiwan could enter the U.N. and other state-based organizations in some capacity.
• He expressed his expectation that a peace agreement with China could be reached in which the PRC would recognize the legitimacy of Taiwan’s government (albeit not its de jure sovereignty).
• He repeatedly criticized the CCP’s human rights record, and particularly excoriated its policies on Tibet during the week before the election; he threatened to boycott the Beijing Olympics if Tibet repression took a turn for the worse and he invited the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan at any time he desired.
• He denounced Premier Wen Jiabao’s assertion that not just the 23 million people of Taiwan, but also the 1.3 billion people of China, deserved a say in Taiwan’s future; Mr. Ma excoriated Mr. Wen’s “ruthless, irrational, arrogant, foolish, and self-righteous comment.”
• Five days after the election, he even met with deep-Green former president (and CCP arch-nemesis) Lee Teng-hui to pay respects and seek the elder statesman’s advice, evidently trying to signal the 42% of voters who supported Frank Hsieh that he still hopes to win their cooperation.

There is no way to know the extent to which Mr. Ma genuinely embraces Taiwan-centric consciousness. But since he has spent almost his entire life in Taiwan—and has never even visited the PRC—it seems unlikely that his moves are purely cynical. He probably considers himself to be a “new Taiwanese,” the term Lee Teng-hui used in endorsing his candidacy for mayor of Taipei in 1998. Certainly the voters seem convinced of Mr. Ma’s sincerity.

But even if his moves to embrace Taiwan-centric consciousness are based purely on a calculation of political expediency, the logic inherent in that calculation will continue to govern his actions and policy choices in the years ahead. Barring a major change in CCP conceptions of China and its history, the eventual result can only be Beijing’s disappointment in Mr. Ma or his successor and the resumption of cross-Strait tensions. The notion of Taiwan being a subject freely determining its own future is inherently at odds with the CCP’s conviction that the island is, now and forever, a (minor) part of the Chinese nation-state whose representation on the world stage the CCP monopolizes.

Eventually this contradiction will have to be addressed, though not necessarily during Mr. Ma’s tenure in office. When that inevitable day comes, Mr. Ma or his successor could well find himself (or herself) labeled a “troublemaker” or “envelope-pusher,” epithets heretofore reserved for Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. In this respect, identity politics remain central to Taiwan’s democratic development and to cross-Strait relations. The identity clash is embedded in the structure of the situation.

Mr. Lynch is associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California and is a member of USC’s U.S.-China Institute.