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A Moratorium on Yasukuni Visits By Kazuhiko Togo While Junichiro Koizumi’s tenure as prime minister has seen many achievements, including the adoption of responsible defense and security policy and the strengthening of Japan’s alliance with the U.S., ties between Japan and China have deteriorated sharply. The rift is especially obvious against the backdrop of expanding economic linkages between the two countries. At a time when Japan-China relations are facing enormous difficulty from both mounting geopolitical rivalry and disputes over World War II history, Mr. Koizumi’s yearly visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from 2001-05 have added to the acrimony. Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine that honors almost 2.5 million war dead, including 14 Class A war criminals convicted after World War II by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Because of this single issue, Chinese leaders have refused high-level talks, first in the form of visits to the respective capitals, and then at the fringe of multilateral summit meetings. State visits stopped taking place from 2002, and the tripartite meeting between Japan, China and Korea within the auspices of Asean Plus Three was suspended in December 2005. Mr. Koizumi has argued that his views remain fundamentally friendly toward China: He took the rise of China not as a challenge but as an opportunity, he was remorseful about Japan’s past, and his visit to Yasukuni was done solely to mourn the war dead and to pledge for peace, without any intension to glorify the past. But he insisted that the issue of mourning the war dead was a matter of his heart, and that no one, including any foreign government, was in a position to intervene. Yasukuni, he said, should never be used as a “diplomatic card.” Mr. Koizumi is due to retire in September 2006, and the issue of what position his successor will take on Yasukuni is gaining public attention in Japan as well as in China and other regional countries. There are influential opinion leaders in Japan who insist that the Yasukuni controversy can only be resolved by China changing its position. They argue that China is cynically using the issue of Class A war criminals’ enshrinement as a “history card” to gain diplomatic leverage over Japan. The 14 war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978, and this became public knowledge in 1979. From then until 1984, three Japanese prime ministers visited the shrine 20 times, but no objection was raised by China. It was only in 1985, when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit and Japanese newspapers gave sensational coverage to that event, that the Chinese government began to make this a serious diplomatic issue. Some Japanese conclude from this that China’s politicization can only end when its leaders genuinely understand that pressure on this issue is of no use. However, I do not entirely agree with this view. Given that this is such a complex and problematic situation, I propose that Mr. Koizumi’s successor as prime minister declare a moratorium on Yasukuni visits, and that subsequent prime ministers would follow this policy until the time comes when a future leader feels that the moratorium could be lifted. The timing of the lifting of the moratorium is hard to predict. It might come in the foreseeable future, or it might not come for many years. There are two reasons for a moratorium. The first comes from a practical and moral point of view. Putting aside for a moment which position is more righteous, Mr. Koizumi’s assertion that it is a matter of his heart, or the Chinese government’s objection that it is impermissible to mourn war dead in a shrine where Class A war criminals are enshrined, there is no denying that this issue is jeopardizing dialogue between the two nations’ leaders. At a time when there are so many real issues which need to be resolved at the top level, the inability to do so is creating harm to both countries. It is in the national interests of both countries to think of a way out. And if this practical consideration necessitates either of the two countries to make the first concession, Japan should take the first step. That’s because when it comes to history, the Japanese side was, after all, on the perpetrator’s side. That background is sufficient reason for Japan to be humble and take the first step toward rapprochement. It will bring nothing but moral dignity to Japan. But the second reason may be more fundamental. Japan has been going through a complex process of revisiting the issue of its identity, once shattered by defeat in World War II. Yasukuni is one of those fundamental contradictions which remained unresolved. This has nothing to do with China. It is exclusively a Japanese problem. If that is the case, why not utilize this opportunity for us to face our history more straightforwardly and try to reach a broad consensus inside Japan to overcome our own unresolved problem. For this, Japan needs some breathing space. This is the main purpose of this moratorium. But China also needs breathing space to reflect on history. Its response to Yasukuni is conditioned by the fact that it underwent a century of humiliation from the mid-19th century until the mid-20th century, subject to encroachment by European colonial powers and ruthless aggression by Japan. Nearly half a century of rule under Mao Zedong restored China’s honor as an emerging international power, but devastated Chinese society. The new course from the end of the 1970s is now pushing the nation to unprecedented economic development as part of the global economy. However, this is accompanied by strong statism and centralization of political power under the Chinese Communist Party. The Marxist or Maoist revolutionary ideology which had worked to forge a strong state until the middle of the 1970s has now lost its unifying power, and nationalism based on the legacy of the CCP in overcoming past humiliation plays a powerful role in maintaining political cohesion. It is no surprise, then, that Japan, whose aggression left the deepest scar on Chinese society, is viewed as an object of national emotion. The education system has certainly played a role in instilling anti-Japanese sentiments, but narratives from the society were the root cause that Chinese youngsters have developed strong feelings against Japan. Therefore it is important that Chinese society also has time to develop and re-examine post-war history. Thus during the declared period of moratorium, I propose that Japan consider three concrete issues: reform of Yasukuni, national debate on the question of war responsibility, and some concrete actions to follow, including the establishment of a national museum of pre-war history. Let’s consider them one by one. Reform of Yasukuni Yasukuni’s complexity today is the result of a decision taken in the wake of World War II by the General Head Quarters of the U.S. occupation forces, the government of Japan, and Yasukuni. Yasukuni was the most important shrine in the State Shinto religion, the chief ideology of militarist Japan. After the war, it was evident that State Shinto had to be abolished, but there were two ways to deal with Yasukuni, with its major task of mourning the war dead: Either allow it to remain a religious institution, as other Shinto shrines did, or force it to become a secular organization under government auspices. The decision was taken to leave Yasukuni as a religious organization, while preserving its position as a shrine for mourning the country’s war dead. This choice put Yasukuni in a unique position in post-World War II Japan. On the one hand, Yasukuni retained a public function. Since many who fought during World War II died with a genuine vision of being reunited there, Yasukuni’s function was increasingly supported by the families and relatives of the war dead. Shinto offered effective rituals to honor the war dead. Since in many instances of Japanese life Shinto performs rituals in relation to funerals, its function at Yasukuni was accepted by many Japanese without discomfort. At the same time, the constitutional provision to separate religion from the state prevented the government from interfering in Yasukuni’s management. Thus, the keepers of the shrine retained the power to develop their own thinking on history. Even today, the shrine preserves and displays the very ideology that led Japan into World War II. This historic view is open for all to see at Yasukuni’s war museum “Yuushuukan,” and it is also abundantly clear in the material on the shrine’s Web site. To clarify my own views on the matter, to the extent that not all policies adopted by Japan before World War II were wrong, I share a few of the contentions advanced by Yasukuni. I am the grandson of Shigenori Togo, who was twice foreign minister of Japan, at the time of the Tojo cabinet, which started World War II, and the Suzuki cabinet, which ended the war. Being a man profoundly dedicated to peace, Shigenori Togo argued strenuously within the Tojo cabinet against the Japanese military to get them to agree on a withdrawal from China, and launched two initiatives to prevent the outbreak of war. One was a long-term agreement, including a Japanese withdrawal from China; another quick fix consisting of a U.S. suspension of the oil embargo and Japanese withdrawal from the southern part of Indochina. These proposals failed, and Japan received the so-called Hull note, which the Japanese leadership took as an ultimatum. I was brought up with stories of the desperate mood which prevailed in the foreign minister’s residence on the eve of the arrival of the Hull note. At the IMTFE, where he was judged a Class A war criminal, Shigenori Togo argued that the way negotiations developed in the last months before Pearl Harbor did not leave him any option other than waging war against the U.S. In addition to his own will to testify the truth, it was the dedicated efforts of Ben Bruce Blakeney, one of the brightest American lawyers working on the defense team, which saved him from the gallows and secured him a 20-year sentence, the second lightest of the tribunal. That said, views of history and the role of the IMTFE are a controversial and complex subject about which Japan itself has not yet come to a consensus. Whatever my personal memory and view on history, I am convinced that Yasukuni is not a place where only one way of looking at history should be displayed. Yasukuni might have played a useful role in preserving the pre-war Japanese narrative, but now that 60 years have passed and a variety of views on the war are being debated in Japan, the time is ripe for Yasukuni to revert to its most important function of mourning those who gave their life for their country within the religious serenity of the Shinto tradition. Those functions represented by the Yuushuukan should be separated from Yasukuni, and if necessary moved somewhere else. Within Japan there is a debate over the construction of a neutral, non-religious national memorial of war dead as a solution of the “Yasukuni controversy.” But I believe that the national memory that many of the soldiers died with the vision of being reunited at Yasukuni is an important legacy that has to be respected. For those who cherish the memory of their fathers, husbands and relatives, it would be very difficult to accept any other place of mourning than Yasukuni. Establishment of a neutral memorial is likely to bring about polarization rather than reconciliation. Thus, the ultimate solution to this controversy lies, in my view, in the reform of Yasukuni to make it acceptable for as many Japanese and foreigners as possible. The first major task is to transform Yasukuni into a place of pure mourning, not a place to learn about the specific world view which led Japan to World War II. Yasukuni’s reform should be related to the task of overcoming the constitutional controversy over its status. As said, Yasukuni started after World War II with the dual function of a religious organization and an organization performing the public function of mourning the war dead. But the Constitution of Japan introduced a clear split between religion and politics under Article 20. As a result, contradictions emerged between society’s expectations and the law. Judicial decisions began to appear ruling that it is unconstitutional for the Japanese prime minister to go to Yasukuni in his official capacity and mourn the war dead, because by doing so, he prays for a special object of worship of a specific religious entity and gives special privilege to a specific shrine. Some of the verdicts implied that mourning the war dead in a private capacity is not prohibited by the Constitution. But from the point of view of those who gave their life for the country, it is natural to expect future prime ministers to visit Yasukuni as a part of their official functions. De-historicization of Yasukuni is a critical step in overcoming the present constitutional impasse over the prime minister’s visits. Debate Over Responsibility Next we have the question of Class A war criminals at the center of international debate on Yasukuni. Since 1985, China has maintained that mourning at Yasukuni implies mourning the 14 Class A war criminals who were enshrined there in 1978, and has urged Japanese prime ministers not to mourn at Yasukuni. Public reaction in Japan on this issue has been varied. There were people who understood Chinese sentiments and argued that the feeling of neighboring Asian nations should be respected. These included former Prime Minister Nakasone, who did not revisit Yasukuni. Except for Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s single visit in 1996, all prime ministers since, until Mr. Koizumi, basically took this position. But some Japanese have also argued that the Chinese request cannot be accepted. Many began to contend that the way a country mourns its war dead is strictly an internal matter of that country. Regarding Class A war criminals, some argued that Japanese do not have the tradition of persecuting those whose lives had already been taken. Others put forward the fact that in post-World War II Japan, those who were sentenced to death or otherwise in war trials were not treated as criminals in accordance with the Japanese internal criminal code. This decision should not be considered as a denial of the IMTFE and other war tribunals, but rather as a recognition that ultimately those who were punished fought for Japan, and Japan is not going to punish them again, in addition to the punishment which they have already been given. By the beginning of the 1970s, pension law allowed war criminals and their families to receive pensions on the same basis as other soldiers or war dead. They argued that the enshrinement of war criminals to Yasukuni was conducted in the same spirit as the revision of the pension law. In reality, though Yasukuni was responsible for enshrining the war dead, the list of those who should be enshrined was prepared by the government. Based on the government-produced list, the enshrinement of Class B and C criminals began in 1959. The list of Class A criminals (seven of whom were executed and seven who died while in prison) was presented by the government to Yasukuni in 1966 and their actual enshrinement took place in 1978. By the end of the 1950s, all detained war criminals were pardoned in accordance with the procedure accepted by the Allies. But have all problems been settled by that logic? I do not think so. One fundamental issue remains. Japanese soldiers committed “damage and suffering” in China, a fact which both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Tomiichi Murayama acknowledged and for which they expressed “deep remorse and heartfelt apology.” If Japanese soldiers committed deeds that merit apology, then who was responsible for that? The question of war responsibility is directly related to the issue of the enshrinement of Class A war criminals. Unless and until Japan itself gives an answer to the question of war responsibility, can we just ignore the significance of Class A war criminals? Even Shintaro Ishihara, one of the leading nationalist politicians and a consistent supporter of visits to Yasukuni, once stated that “Well, me too, when in 1978 I heard that Class A war criminals were enshrined, I also thought ‘oh! oh! oh!’......” In the post-World War II discourse on history and Japan’s identity, the issue of war responsibility has been one of the most difficult issues about which there is no answer, no consensus and even no direction. I cannot prejudge where the discussion might lead. The recent agreement between the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun newspapers to delve into the question of war responsibility is an encouraging development. But the impact of this search and its conclusion are far from predictable. Nevertheless, I can foresee two directions in which the discourse might lead. The first is that, one way or other, Japan reaches a consensus on the responsibility pertaining to individuals. This outcome should be somehow related to the verdict of the IMTFE, and could lead to the re-examination of the enshrinement of some or all of the Class A war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine. I am aware that current Shinto doctrine maintains that, once enshrined, spirits become a part of the holistic family of spirits and are inseparable. I am not qualified to analyze Shinto theology. But if we come back to the original situation, that Yasukuni can mourn the war dead exclusively based on the list composed by the government of Japan, I think that there should be room for Yasukuni theologians to adapt to the political decision taken by the government without jeopardizing Shinto’s fundamental beliefs. The second direction is to delve into the responsibility of the nation as a whole. Facing the outside world, there is the undeniable fact that a substantial majority of prewar public opinion, media, intellectuals and political leaders all supported Japanese expansion on the continent. Naturally there was an internal distinction between those who led or supported prewar policy or actions and those who just had to obey or did everything to prevent them. But ultimately nobody is in a position to back away from that responsibility. Is it not morally superior to acknowledge that there is only one way to take responsibility, and that is by “Japan as a whole”? This conclusion, as banal as it sounds, has serious consequences. Some Japanese enthusiastically supported the invasion of China, and then escaped blame by hypocritically maintaining that they had nothing to do with it as soon as such action was criminalized after the end of war. At the same time, others gave their life to take responsibility for actions committed by the nation as a whole. This could apply to the Class A war criminals. Spreading the blame makes the former group take at least some share, while creating room for mourning the latter. This logic flies in the face of the argument of the Chinese and others who say that mourning at Yasukuni is offensive. But if this conclusion, namely a shared recognition that it must be “Japan as a whole” that takes responsibility for the unworthy wartime activities, becomes Japan’s national consensus, I do hope that the world would accept this conclusion with respect, even if they cannot agree immediately with all of its implications. As stated, I have no way of detecting where the direction of this debate would head. I personally think that the highest moral ground which Japan can take is to accept responsibility as “Japan as a whole.” I also think that it fits better with the way Japan adjusted to the outcome of the IMTFE in the implementation of its internal criminal code. But it may become the consensus of the nation that some leaders must take responsibility, even if it is too difficult to name specific people, and therefore Class A war criminals as identified at the IMTFE should symbolically take that blame. In that case, there emerges new grounds to end their enshrinement in Yasukuni on the basis of government decision and in accordance with the procedures to be established by Yasukuni. Because Shigenori Togo died in 1950 in Sugamo Prison one month after he finished writing his autobiography, he was enshrined at Yasukuni as one of the 14 war criminals in 1978. My parents were a little surprised when they were informed about the decision, but the issue has never been discussed seriously in my family since then. Shigenori Togo gave his life to prevent the war from happening (and failed) and to end the war (and succeeded). He fought at the IMTFE to defend the honor of his country and himself. That was his war and his honor. Looking back at the post-war Yasukuni controversy from the record of my family, I express on the one hand my gratitude to those who tried to honor my grandfather as someone who gave his life for the betterment of his country, but at the same time I firmly believe that these personal circumstances should not hinder the possibility to reach a national consensus which is so necessary for Japan. Concrete Actions If the above-mentioned directions, transforming Yasukuni into a place of pure mourning and determining the question of war responsibility, could be achieved as the result of national consensus, a totally different Japan, one that is able to face its history, would emerge. But in order for this new Japan to take a clear position that is understood by all outside observers, there is a need to consolidate these decisions with concrete actions. • Found a national museum of prewar history. Yuushuukan has developed an exhibition which resurrects the then existing national narrative from the Meiji Restoration until the end of 1945. So where is the museum which portrays the vision of Japan through World War II in its entirety from the point of view of contemporary Japan? Hasn’t the time come to create a national museum which describes prewar Japan in its entirety? Given the polarization of Japanese views between the left and the right, the enormity of this task is obvious. But this task is not directed at China, or Korea, or any other nation; the task is directed at Japan, so as to face the memory of what our fathers and grandfathers did, what they aspired to and what they actually inflicted on others. The museum should exhibit everything that Japan’s elder generation hopes to pass on to the younger generation, good or bad, that the younger generation should remember. It should narrate exactly what took place in Japan in the years leading up to World War II, and what happened in the countries where war was fought in the name of the Japanese Empire. On the one hand, some narrative based on the 1995 Murayama and 2005 Koizumi statements must be clearly manifested. Chinese and Korean historians can, and I hope they would, closely cooperate in order to show how history was felt and viewed on the other side of the continent, not with a view to using this opportunity to propagate their nationalism, but in order to leave something genuine and true in the memory of future Japanese generations. In the War of the Pacific, at least three aspects—actual fighting, bombardment of Japanese cities and the fate of POWs—have to be shown. In some of the narratives of the actual fighting, bravery and sacrifice made by soldiers in good faith have to be shown. Yuushuukan may have some contribution to make in that context. Adequate information could also be given to tell the viewers that Japan was on the verge of extermination should the war have continued. At the same time, the young generation of Japanese should leave the museum wondering why Japan, which spearheaded Asian nations in their efforts to achieve modernization and liberation from European imperialism before the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05, only 40 years later ended up as the aggressor in China and rebuked for its atrocities in many countries. • Consider new moral and philosophical principles for the nation. From the 1950s through the early 1970s, Japan went through a painful process of being reaccepted by international society. Japan re-established diplomatic relations with all countries except for North Korea, and through this process resolved all legal issues related to war responsibility. I do not argue for any reopening of these fundamentals of post-war Japan’s reintroduction to international society. But Japan could take steps to anchor itself and harmonize better with its past. It might then gain greater confidence, and that confidence could lead Japan to a moral high ground on the basis of which it might manifest its thinking regarding its past with greater humility and forbearance. Without limiting the debates to take place in the future, my own supposition of the newly established morality can be summarized in the following five principles: 1. The memory of the perpetrator should be longer than the memory of the victim. In reality, human psychology works the other way round. Precisely for this reason, therefore, there is a need for moral strength to achieve this higher ground. In the case of Japan and China, as well as Japan and Korea, there is no other view than that Japan was on the perpetrator’s side, whereas China and Korea were on the victim’s side. 2. Apology is a one-way action, whereas reconciliation is a two-way action. You apologize because you think your actions were wrong. You do not apologize on the condition that the apology be accepted. This is a fundamental principle of human morality. Reconciliation is different. If the victim’s side does not accept the apology, reconciliation does not stand. In the real world of politics, it may be that apology has to be somehow linked with reconciliation. And yet, from the point of view of morality, something is wrong in that attitude. 3. What do you mean when you apologize? This is a question always pertinent to ask yourself. As discussed, the Japanese government had amply apologized already. But as for each individual, it is still pertinent to think, what is required of your own knowledge, memory and heart to manifest your apology. 4. Responsibility transcends generations. Increasingly Japan is filled with younger generations who were brought up in the environment of pacifism and concentration on material wealth, who have never dreamed of doing something militarily menacing or dangerous. I was born in 1945 and was clearly not in a position to participate in any of the atrocities committed. But as a Japanese I bear a generational responsibility for the actions committed by my parents’ and grandparents’ generation, just as I have a generational responsibility to clear their honor if need be. If contradictions are not resolved in my generation, younger generations will have to carry the responsibility to resolve them. 5. All these moral grounds must come and should come from inside Japan. It is not a matter to be decided by outsiders. Each principle should be expressed on the basis of unambiguous, unconditional and unilateral judgment. That judgment does not depend on the reaction of the other side. If the other side decides to move ahead to narrow the gap between the two countries, something like a “grand reconciliation” or “grand bargain” may result. But it should never be the primary aim. • Regaining an Asian identity. This position may enable Japan to overcome one of the fundamental fallacies of some of the extreme nationalist contentions. The ultimate urge of the nationalist discourse is to bring back the honor of those soldiers who fought in good faith for their country. But in real terms, what were the values for which they were prepared to give their life? In some cases, it was for parents, wives, children, brothers and sisters. In other cases it was the Japanese state or the emperor which embodied Japan’s statehood. But in many cases, it was also the toyo heiwa, or “oriental peace.” Many died believing in values which transcend the narrow boundary of Japan, envisaging a greater good and justice for Asia. If that was the case, there is only one way to console the souls of those who died in good faith for Asia, and that is to re-enter Asia and to be accepted as a genuine member of Asia. There is only one way to achieve this objective. It is through the heart and morality of contemporary Japanese. Japan can never regain its national identity without recapturing its Asian identity. The demise of a forward-looking China policy and the rise of anti-China sentiments as expressed in nationalist discourse are regrettable because they represent a renunciation of the real past. They betray the profound national objective of re-entering Asia. This has to be corrected. • Other actions to follow. The five principles stated above are moral principles and are not intended to amend the basic legal and political structure of post-World War II Japan. In terms of actions to follow, Japan can rightly argue that the most important action based on Japan’s contrition lies in its determination never to let militarist aggression happen again, namely, in the completely pacifist record which Japan kept for 60 years after World War II. Nevertheless, the adoption of such principles could make Japan’s position regarding its past more forbearing and humble. With this new approach of morality, some of the contentious issues under debate now, such as the textbook controversy or some of the legal debates underway, might be subject to a different solution. Also, if this moral attitude could be firmly established, it might be embodied in clearer proactive actions, such as sending a yearly mission to China or elsewhere to show that Japan is not oblivious to the past. These ideas should emerge naturally in the course of deliberations. Following the decision for a moratorium on Yasukuni visits, the Japanese government and people need to tackle a long-neglected agenda in order to overcome the past. This should involve four aspects: • Preserve Yasukuni as the central place for mourning in Japan, provided that substantial reform takes place in relation to its historical recognition. • Initiate national debate on the issue of war responsibility, and upon its successful conclusion, decide on appropriate treatment for the Class A war criminals enshrined in Yasukuni. • Reach a consensus on Japan’s lost national identity, resolving the issue of what was right and wrong in its prewar world view and show it to the world, in part through the establishment of a comprehensive national museum of prewar Japan. • Harmonize Japan’s efforts of regaining its national identity with its post-World War II objective of re-entering Asia and regaining its Asian identity. This process may be a long one, and it may not succeed in promoting reconciliation with China in the immediate future. But at least Japan would be equipped with a long-term strategy to deal with its past and overcome present contradictions. From the point of view of Japan’s national interest, I firmly believe that however difficult and time-consuming it might be, moving ahead with a clear direction is infinitely better than remaining adrift, facing domestic polarization and impossible difficulties in relations with the rest of Asia. Japan will then take the moral high ground, moving forward to overcome the history issue with courage and sincerity. Even after all the above-mentioned policy objectives are achieved, Japan may still not be able to overcome its past completely. But that will be a story to be told in the long-time future, not foreseeable today. Mr. Togo is a former Japanese ambassador to the Netherlands and a visiting researcher at Princeton University. |
